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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins: The Misuse Defense When
Design Defect and Plaintiff Misuse Concur to Cause Injury
Robert Hopkins sued General Motors Corporation, the manufacturer of
his pickup truck, and Bud Moore Chevrolet, the dealer, under strict liability
in tort for personal injuries he suffered while a passenger in his truck.
Hopkins claimed that the driver lost control of the truck due to a defective
carburetor and that the design defect was a producing cause of Hopkins'
injuries. General Motors asserted that Hopkins' alterations to the carburetor
constituted misuse, heretofore a complete defense to a strict liability charge.
The jury found that the carburetor was defectively designed, that Hopkins'
changes constituted misuse of the product, and that both factors were
producing causes of the accident. The trial court, disregarding the jury's
findings of misuse, entered judgment for the plaintiff. The court of civil
appeals found evidence to support the jury's conclusions, but affirmed the
judgment on the grounds that misuse which is only a concurring cause of an
accident does not relieve a manufacturer from strict liability.' General
Motors appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. Held, affirmed: If a defective
product is a producing cause of the damaging event and the plaintiff's
misuse is a proximate cause of the accident, the plaintiff's recovery is
limited to that portion of the damages attributable to the product's defect.
General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
I. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN TEXAS
In 1967 the Texas Supreme Court adopted section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts ,' thereby introducing into Texas law the concept of
strict products liability in tort.3 The court based its decision on the policy
considerations of risk spreading and justifiable consumer expectations.
These policy considerations, however, were not viewed by the court as
precluding the assertion of defenses to the new type of liability.4
A plaintiff's recovery under strict liability depends first on his showing
that the product was defective when it left the hands of the manufacturer,5
and secondly, that it was unreasonably dangerous.6 Under Texas law a
I. 535 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1976).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
3. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
4. Id. at 790. See also Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779
(Tex. 1967).
5. Texas courts have accepted various methods of tracing the defect to the manufacturer.
See, e.g., Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1969) (evidence
that product not mishandled after leaving manufacturer's control); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co.,
440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969) (circumstantial evidence that defect in automobile existed at time of
sale); Ford Motor Co. v. Ted Arendale Ford Sales, Inc., 447 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1969, no writ) (plaintiff had complained about symptoms of auto's defect several times
prior to accident).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i (1965) provides: "The article sold
must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics." In cases involving a design defect, courts applying Texas law have treated the
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defect may result from a malfunction in a normally safe manufacturing
process,7 a defective product design,8 or a failure to warn of a product's
dangerous propensity.9 If the plaintiff lacks evidence of a specific defect,
circumstantial evidence of the product's malfunction may establish its de-
fective nature."0 A causal link must also be established between the alleged
defect and the injury. An early trend of Texas cases required varying
degrees of proof of causation, depending on the type of defect." A later
trend of cases recognized that because the same policy considerations
applied to all product defects, the same proof of causation should be re-
quired regardless of the type of defect; 12 consequently, the courts dropped
the distinction. The plaintiff now must show only that the defective product
was a producing cause, rather than the sole cause, of his injuries. 3
A significant problem in products liability has been the determination of
when a plaintiff's conduct will defeat his recovery. 4 Three categories of
defenses have emerged: (a) contributory negligence; (b) unreasonable as-
sumption of risk; and (c) abnormal use, or misuse.' 5 Texas courts have
adopted the position espoused by the Restatement 6 that the plaintiff's
negligence in failing to discover the defect or to guard against the defect's
existence should not bar his recovery.17 Texas courts have also accepted the
dangerous nature of the product as the defect. See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 498 F.2d
1264 (5th Cir. 1974) ("defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous" essentially synony-
mous); Messick v. General Motors Corp., 460 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1972); Rourke v. Garza, 530
S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975). But see Metal Window Prod. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ). See generally Keeton, Products Liability and
the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Sales & Perdue, The Law of Strict Tort
Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REV. 1, 27-30,(1977).
7. See, e.g., Crump v. Clark Equip. Co., 481 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1973); C.A. Hoover& Son
v. O.M. Franklin Serum Co., 444 S.W.2d 5% (Tex. 1969).
8. See, e.g., Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975); Helicoid Gage Div. of Am.
Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, no writ).
9. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Bituminous
Cas. Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
10. See, e.g., Franks v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 414 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969); C.A.
Hoover & Son v. O.M. Franklin Serum Co., 444 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. 1969); Ford Motor Co. v.
Bland, 517 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
11. See, e.g., C.A. Hoover & Son v. O.M. Franklin Serum Co., 444 S.W.2d 5% (Tex.
1969); Hebert v. Loveless, 474 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The Texas Supreme Court recently endorsed the use of circumstantial evidence in proving
causation. Birmingham v. Gulf Oil Corp., 516 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1974) (involving collapse of
crane on offshore drilling platform).
12. See, e.g., Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975); Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454
S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, no writ).
13. See, e.g., Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975); Helicoid Gage Div. of Am.
Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). There may be more than one producing cause. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v.
Russell & Smith Ford Co., 474 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no
writ).
14. See generally Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and
Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93 (1972); Sales & Perdue, supra note 6, at 63-70.
15. W. PROSSER, TORTS, § 102 (4th ed. 1971).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
17. The Supreme Court eliminated the defense of contributory negligence in Shamrock
Fuel & Oil, Inc. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967). The court went even further in
Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974), and allowed a plaintiff to recover
when she negligently drove into a light pole after discovering that her car had faulty brakes. Her
negligence was a proximate cause of her injuries, but the court concluded that in light of the
defect, Mrs. Henderson had no realistic alternatives.
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Restatement's definition of assumption of risk, 8 and retained it as a defense
to strict liability.19
Misuse, the third defense,2" has also presented significant problems, in
part because of its interrelationship with the other two defenses. 2 I Manufac-
turers have not ordinarily been expected to guard against unforeseeable uses
of the product, and proof that such misuse caused the plaintiff's injury has
traditionally foreclosed any recovery. 2 Actions which courts have recog-
nized as misuse include violation of instructions and warnings, 23 misapplica-
tion of or improper mixing of products,24 and substantial alterations of the
product by the consumer.25
To invoke the defense of misuse prior to Hopkins the defendant had to
show that the plaintiff's use of the product was not reasonably foreseeable
by the manufacturer and was a use which the consumer could not reason-
ably think proper.26 Once proven, such misuse would totally bar recovery
even if it were merely a producing cause of the accident. 27 Texas courts had
not yet focused on the situation in which the product defect and a plaintiff's
misuse coincided to cause an injury.
II. GENERAL MOTORS CORP. V. HOPKINS
In General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins the Texas Supreme Court considered
three issues. The court first considered the propriety of the lower court's
finding that Hopkins' truck was defectively designed.28 Secondly, the court
18. "If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and neverthe-
less, proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from
recovery." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965). There are four
elements to the assumption of risk defense: (a) knowledge of the dangerous condition; (b)
knowledge of the danger; (c) appreciation of the nature or extent of the danger; and (d)
voluntary exposure to the danger. J&W Corp. v. Ball, 414 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1967); Halepeska
v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963).
19. Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1972). The language of Comment n
has been criticized for its vagueness. Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring
Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability Era, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1974). The difficulty of
applying the assumption of risk defense is compounded by the fact that until recently, Texas
courts have applied it only to contractual cases, while applying volenti non fit injuria to other
products liability cases. See generally Greenhill, Assumption of Risk, 16 BAYLOR L. REV. 1.11
(1964); Keeton, Assumption of Products Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965). Sharpe abolished this
distinction.
20. See generally .Noel, supra note 14, and cases cited therein.
21. In Jacobs v. Technical Chem. Co., 472 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972), misuse was said to be close to
contributory negligence. In other cases it has seemed more similar to assumption of the risk.
See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Langley, 422 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1967, writ dism'd).
22. See generally Noel, supra note 14, and cases cited therein.
23. See, e.g., McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968); Procter & Gamble
Mfg. Co. v. Langley, 422 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, writ dism'd).
24. See, e.g., Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 913 (1968).
25. See, e.g., Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969). See generally Annot.,
41 A.L.R.3d 1251 (1972).
26. See, e.g., Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (not sufficient for the defendant to show only abnormal use); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(misuse defense further limited if adequate warning would have prevented abnormal use).
27. See, e.g., Kudelka v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 541 F,2d 651 (7th Cir. 1976);
Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 490 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1974); McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391
F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1968).
28. 548 S.W.2d 344, 346-47 (Tex. 1977).
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reviewed the question of whether Hopkins' alterations constituted misuse.2 9
Finally, and most importantly, the court considered narrowing the scope of
the misuse defense in Texas products liability cases. 30
The court summarily disposed of the defective design issue, finding ample
evidence to support the jury's conclusion that a defect did, in fact, exist.31
The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury's finding that Hopkins' alterations to the carburetor constituted misuse
of the vehicle and that such misuse was a producing cause. 32 The court,
therefore, found that the product's defect and the plaintiff's misuse had
concurred to cause the accident.33
The supreme court acknowledged that this was a case of first impres-
sion.34 Citing numerous cases involving the misuse defense,35 the court
observed that heretofore defendants had traditionally asserted misuse to
disprove product defect or to prove that the plaintiff's misuse, not the
defect, caused the plaintiff's injury. 36 The court in Hopkins, however, found
no guiding authority either in the case law or the Restatement37 for the
situation in which a defective product and misuse concur to cause the
plaintiff's injury. 38
Confronted with this novel situation, the court formulated two rules.
First, it announced that misuse is not a defense to an action brought by an
innocent bystander when a product is dangerous for its foreseeable uses, 9
thus extending well-settled policy considerations which allow recovery by
innocent parties.'
The court was, however, unwilling to eliminate the defense of misuse
when the plaintiff himself misused the product and should have foreseen
that his actions would create or increase the attendant danger." Thus, in
29. Id. at 348-49.
30. Id. at 349-52.
31. The jury had been instructed that: "defective design meant a carburetor so designed
• . . that it would create an 'unreasonable risk of harm.' "Id. at 347 n. 1. It had been instructed
that the term "unreasonable risk of harm" as applied to product design meant a product so
dangerous that a prudent manufacturer aware of its risk would not market it, and the product
would not meet the ordinary consumer's reasonable expectations of safety. The supreme court
found ample evidence to support the jury's finding that the truck's lockout pin could jam the
carburetor's secondary valves open, allowing large amounts of fuel to rush into the engine. Two
witnesses had testified that a similar malfunction had occurred a few weeks prior to the
accident. Evidence of this malfunction, which occurred before Hopkins' alterations, bolstered
his claims, but perhaps the most conclusive proof of defect was evidence indicating General
Motors' knowledge of the design problem as early as 1968. Id. at 347.
32. Id. at 349.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 351.
35. Id. at 349-50. Most cases cited by the court were from other states.
36. Id. at 351.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment h (1965) provides: "A product is
not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption. If the injury
results from abnormal handling . . . or from abnormal preparation for use .... the seller is
not liable."
38. 548 S.W.2d at 351.
39. Id. See generally Comment, Misuse as a Bar to Bystander Recovery Under Strict
Products Liability, 10 Hous. L. REV. 1106 (1973).
40. The first case in which the Texas Supreme Court allowed bystanders to recover under
strict products liability was Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969). See
generally Noel, Defective Products: Extension of Strict Liability to Bystanders, 38 TENN. L.
REV. 1 (1970).
41. 548 S.W.2d at 351.
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formulating its second rule of law, the court increased the defendant's
burden while at the same time moving toward a comparative fault system for
products liability. Reasoning that the policy basis for strict liability was not
culpability, but risk-spreading and protection of the public,42 the court held
that the defect need only be a producing cause of the injury for the manufac-
turer to be liable.4 3 The court, however, recognized that a manufacturer
should not be an insurer; he should not be required to pay for all damages
suffered by a user who contributes to his own harm by misusing the prod-
uct. 44 Therefore, the extent of the defendant's liability should vary in pro-
portion to the degree to which the defect contributed to the injury.
For the defendant to be totally relieved of liability, he must meet a heavy
burden of proof; the defendant must show either that the product was not
defective, or that the misuse rather than the defect was the sole cause of
injury. If the defendant is unable to sustain this burden, he may assert the
affirmative defense of misuse.45 In order to do so, he must prove that the
misuse was a proximate cause 46 of the damaging event, and the percentage
of the injury's cause attributable to the misuse. 47 As an essential element of
proximate cause, the defendant must prove that the plaintiff should reason-
ably have anticipated that the specific malfunction or injury, or a similar
one, would occur as a result of the misuse. 4' This aspect of the court's
opinion significantly alters Texas law. Prior to Hopkins a manufacturer had
to show that the plaintiff's misuse was unforeseeable to the manufacturer,
whereas now he must also show that the plaintiff should reasonably have
foreseen the type of damaging event or injury which resulted from the
plaintiff's misuse.49 The plaintiff's misuse will not limit his recovery, howev-
er, if the specific type of malfunction or damaging event was not reasonably
foreseeable.
42. Id.; accord, Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales, Inc. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).
43. 548 S.W.2d at 351; accord, Helicoid Gage Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell,
511 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pizza Inn, Inc. v.
Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, no writ).
44. 548 S.W.2d at 351; accord, Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, 529 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1976);
Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1968).
45. 548 S.W.2d at 351. The trial court defined "misuse" as "use of a vehicle in which it is
mishandled in a way that the manufacturer could not reasonably have foreseen or expected in
the normal and intended use of the vehicle." Id. at 348 n.2. Whether the manufacturer,
knowing of the defect, should have foreseen that the plaintiff would alter the carburetor
remains an open question, since the supreme court seemed to assume that Hopkins' misuse was
unforeseeable. See generally Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN.
L. REV. 171 (1974).
46. 548 S.W.2d at 351-52. The court defined "proximate cause" as "that cause, which in its
natural and continuous sequence, produces a result that would not have occurred but for such
cause, and which said result ought reasonably to have been foreseen or anticipated in light of
the attending circumstances." Id. at 352 n.4 (quoting Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Black, 152
Tex. 343, 345, 257 S.W.2d 416, 422 (1953)). The court defined "producing cause" as:
an efficient, exciting or contributory cause, which in a natural and continuous
sequence caused in whole or in part the occurrence of injuries, if any, in
question, and but for such cause the occurrence or injuries would not have
occurred. There can be more than one producing cause, but there may be only
one 'sole producing cause' of any occurrence.
548 S.W.2d at 351.
47. 548 S.W.2d at 352.
48. Id.




If the defendant can surmount each of the above hurdles, the trier of fact
must then determine the respective percentages by which the concurring
causes contributed to the accident.5 1 The plaintiff's recovery will be limited
to that portion of his damages attributable to the product defect. Although
acknowledging that General Motors might have pleaded its defense differ-
ently had it anticipated such a change in the law, 52 the court found no error in
the trial court's judgment and, therefore, refused to remand 3.5
In this obscure opinion, the supreme court narrowed the misuse defense,
making it more difficult for the defendant to prove. The court also seemed to
be moving toward a comparative fault system of products liability in the area
of design defect, and under that system misuse is no longer a complete
defense.54 Nonetheless, the court expressly stated that its ruling should not
be confused with the Texas modified comparative negligence scheme.5
The decision raises far more questions than it answers and creates poten-
tial problems both in and out of the courtroom. For example, the opinion
does not clearly state whether it applies only in cases of design defect or in
all product liability cases. The trier of fact may encounter difficulty not only
in differentiating between, but also in comparing, the proximate cause and
producing cause. 6 Calculation of percentages of cause, particularly when
multiple parties are involved, could prove an almost impossible task for
even the most sophisticated jury. 57
51. Id. at 352. Following Hopkins, the plaintiff may recover some of his loss even if his
misuse is 99% the cause of his injuries. Under the Texas comparative negligence system a
plaintiff may not recover if his negligence is greater than the defendant's. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 2212a, § I (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
52. 548 S.W.2d at 352. General Motors failed to plead misuse as a proximate cause or to
seek a finding on the percentage of cause attributable to misuse.
53. Id.; see Halespeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963).
54. Several states have applied some form of comparative fault system to products liability.
For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d
55, 64-65 (1967), reasoned that strict liability was equivalent to negligence per se; thus,
negligence defenses and the state's modified comparative negligence statute should apply. In
Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972), a federal court applying
New Hampshire law found that since the state's comparative negligence statute replaced a
statute on contributory negligence, which had been a defense to strict liability, the new statute
should also be a defense to products liability. A federal court in Idaho interpreted that state's
comparative negligence statute in Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F.
Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976). The court reasoned that strict liability, founded on the concept of
loss-spreading, merely imposed a higher standard of care than negligence. Because the com-
parative negligence statute was not specifically limited to cases of ordinary negligence, the
statute should apply to all legal causes of the plaintiff's injury, including strict liability defects
and misuse. The court then applied comparative cause. Finally, in Butaud v. Suburban Marine
& Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alas. 1976), the Supreme Court of Alaska adopted the
judicial doctrine of comparative negligence for use in products liability cases involving assump-
tion of the risk and misuse. The court in Hopkins does not openly adopt any of the above
approaches, but the ruling most nearly resembles the Idaho decision discussed above. See
Kinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835 (Colo. App. 1976), in which the court refused to apply
comparative negligence to products liability for policy reasons. See generally Sales & Perdue,
The Law of Strict Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1977); Schwartz, supra note 45.
55. 548 S.W.2d at 352. The Texas comparative negligence statute allows a plaintiff who is
injured as a result of another's negligence to recover if the plaintiff's negligence is not greater
than that of the defendant. Damages are measured in proportion to each party's negligence.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § I (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
56. But see Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alas. 1976),
in which the court rejected arguments that strict products liability is incompatible with com-
parative negligence.
57. Juries would probably find it easier to compare fault than to compare causes.
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The court's failure to follow the course of several other states58 which
have openly acknowledged the appropriateness of applying an existing com-
parative negligence system to products liability is curious. By requiring the
defendant to prove proximate cause and foreseeable injury, the court appar-
ently adopts comparative negligence in products liability, yet it carefully
sidesteps the issue by referring to comparative causes. 9 Perhaps this choice
of terminology can be explained by the court's natural fear of assuming a
legislative role. By adopting "comparative cause" rather than "comparative
negligence," the court could avoid the modified statutory system and retain
a pure comparative system more favorable to a plaintiff's recovery.' The
ruling also differs from comparative negligence by approving jury instruc-
tions which would require a defendant to convince the jury that the plaintiff,
before misusing the product, should reasonably have foreseen the particular
type of malfunction or injury which occurred. As a practical matter, while
juries may find that a plaintiff should have foreseen some injury resulting
from his misuse, it seems unlikely that juries will find the particular accident
or injury foreseeable. Despite what the courts have often said, the effect of
this decision may render the manufacturer an insurer.6 While strong public
policies support recovery in products liability cases, such policies should not
undermine cautious, although imperfect, product development.62
III. CONCLUSION
After adopting section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
Texas Supreme Court struggled to clarify the instances in which a plaintiff's
actions bar his recovery. Prior to Hopkins courts had not squarely confront-
ed a situation where a design defect and the plaintiff's misuse of the product
coincided to cause the plaintiff's injuries. In Hopkins the supreme court
announced that if the manufacturer of a defectively designed product could
prove that the plaintiff's unforeseeable misuse was a proximate cause of the
injury, the plaintiff's recovery would be reduced by that percentage of cause
attributable to his misuse. Although the court reached the proper conclusion
under the specific facts of Hopkins, the perplexing opinion fails to disclose
58. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
59. 548 S.W.2d at 352. In Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp.
598 (D. Idaho 1976), a federal district court justified the use of comparative cause in products
liability because if misuse had been an absolute defense, a plaintiff whosemisuse was 1% the
cause of his accident would be unable to recover. The court's holding in Hopkins suggests
similar policy considerations, although the court never explains its reasoning or cites Sun Valley
Airlines.
60. If the court had adopted comparative negligence, their choice of a "pure" rather than a
modified" system would have conflicted with the legislative policy set forth in the compara-
tive negligence statute. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § I (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
61. Courts applying Texas law have often insisted that manufacturers should not be
insurers. Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, 529 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1976); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,
Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974). Nevertheless, the practical effect of this decision is to make
misuse very difficult to prove in cases where the product is also defective. The only remaining
defense in products liability is assumption of the risk, which is also difficult to prove. See notes
18-19 supra. As a result of the Hopkins decision, manufacturers may pay large judgments when
previously they would have been immune because of the misuse defense. They may begin to
scrutinize more closely their legal exposure before marketing new products.
62. See generally Hoenig, Products Liability Problems and Proposed Reforms, 1977 INS.
L.J. 213.
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